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The Problem of Money Illusion in Economics 
 
 
Introduction 
In economic theory and analysis one key assumption in mathematical models is always to 
assume that there is no money illusion, i.e. economic agents can successfully dissect real and 
money values appropriately. This gives the opportunity to separate the economic spheres of 
real goods and services from those of the monetary valuation of such goods and services, i.e. 
asset markets. This dichotomy however contributes to a misunderstanding of the 
interdependencies between both spheres. Money is even considered in this analytical 
framework only to be another good which acts as a numéraire to standardize the valuation in a 
common accounting unit. Because of the convenience for analytical research it has become 
something like a dogma for good and bad economics. Theories excluding money illusion are 
good economic theories; those assuming money illusion are bad economic theories, because 
the latter lead to irrational behaviour and false conclusions about the fundamentals of a 
market oriented economic system. However, money illusion is an essential ingredient of 
financial markets which just reflect the intrinsic inconsistencies in the valuation process of 
financial market assets. Abstracting from money illusion misleads the theoretical economists 
to believe in an ideal world of efficient financial markets and overlook the inherent financial 
instability of asset markets. 
James Tobin (1972, p.3), a nobel laureate in economics, went as far, by making the statement 
that: “An economic theorist can, of cause (sic! G.E.), commit no greater crime than to assume 
money illusion.” This is an expression of overconfidence of the economist profession in the 
validity of one central postulate of economic reasoning about markets as institutions to 
coordinate social interactions related to goods and services. With money illusion embodied in 
economic analysis there will be market failures in the sense that they cannot establish justice 
in a society based on the market exchange mechanism. False trading, i.e. accepting in the 
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exchange process prices which are out of equilibrium and non-converging towards an 
equilibrium in a tâtonnement process à la Walras (1874), has the frightening consequence that 
most of the theoretical explanations common in current economic textbooks and theoretical 
economic models presented there break down. 
Fundamentalism, i.e. dismissing some of the fundamental axioms of economic theories, in the 
economic profession was always something which led normally to the exclusion from the 
profession. This in particular had also the consequence that the person who challenged these 
assumptions had to be aware to face a professional ban, e.g. dismissal as a university lecturer. 
It needed well established top academic economists to change this situation. The incentive 
system of academic economics is more or less: “Please leave the basic axioms of our 
theoretical foundations untouched otherwise you could face excommunication from our 
discipline and will be outlawed from the career track. 
Opening the box of Pandora of axioms in economic theory was and still is for most 
economists therefore strictly forbidden. Those who do so where considered heretics in the 
religious sense and often dismissed as members of the economist profession. This attitude has 
much in common with religions who expect from there disciples that the credo of religious 
beliefs that cannot be questioned without losing the faith in the religious belief.  If Jesus is not 
the son of god, you cannot be a Christian, or if you believe that Mohammed is not the prophet 
of god, you cannot be Muslim etc. If you dismiss the fundamental beliefs of economists that 
there is no money illusion you cannot be any longer an academic economist. This has only 
changed very slowly with the advent of a more on empirical evidence based economic 
research which led to the behavioural economics revolution over the last two decades (see e.g. 
Thaler 1992). 
The analytical separability of monetary and the real world economics, however, have been 
more and more challenged in the current economic debate which accepts money illusion as a 
possibility in human behaviour (see e.g. Fehr, Tyran 2001). It is also no accident that the first 
area of questioning the rationality assumption of no-money-illusion emerged in the area of 
finance and led to the development of theories of behavioural finance (Akerlof, Shiller 2009, 
Malkiel 2003). They directly attacked the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) which was 
canonized1 before by academic economists like Fama (1970). This schism between those who 
believe in EHM and those who don’t has not been settled yet.  
                                                 
1
 The efficient-market hypothesis was developed by Professor Eugene Fama at the University Of Chicago Booth 
School Of Business as an academic concept of study through his published Ph.D. thesis in the early 1960s at the 
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Again like in schisms in religious schools both communities coexists at the academic 
faculties, but each would like to drive the other out, where possible. Financial markets are in 
particular challenging for believers in the EHM because there exist no natural frictions as in 
real world commodity markets. Contracts on financial markets especially nowadays after 
these markets are primarily executed via electronic computer networks on trading platforms 
deliver instantaneous information around the globe. Prices for financial assets are seemingly 
accessible instantaneously. If those markets fail to be efficient, how much more the others 
will do so who face many more inertia due to a less global information exchange 
infrastructure and transportation costs to deliver them from their origin to their destinations? 
One might therefore consider the invalidity of the EMH in the area of financial markets to be 
an experimentum crucis for the validity of the EMH for any kind of market system. 
Money seems in particular since it has become fiat money, i.e. not bound to the real 
commodity like silver and gold, as a medium of exchange a particular challenge for economic 
analysis since it poses another significant valuation problem to a society. The most important 
is the inflation-deflation-nexus. Another related phenomenon hard to explain is involuntary 
unemployment. 
From a behavioural point of view general excess supply or demand for money needs to be 
explained by institutional failures like a central bank creating too much or too little liquidity 
(see e.g. Friedman, Schwartz 1971). In labor markets again institutional settings are used to 
explain their imperfections. This means that not the rational decision making based on money 
values is flawed, but the institutions like a central bank is flawed by following wrong 
monetary policies or trade unions are blamed to set non-market-clearing too high wage levels. 
Wage adjustments in labor markets are as well a standard example for downward stickiness of 
wages creating since Keynes (1936) a whole bunch of literature about strategies to accomplish 
a better employment situation by taking into account the empirical finding of wage-rigidities. 
In a perfectly rational environment of homo oeconomicie contracting instantaneously and 
independently from each other this should lead to price adjustments in market prices with 
respect to an increase in the general price level or full-employment in the labor market. The 
observable inertia in the delayed adjustment to this result was simply explained by 
information problems or adjustment costs of price adjustment. Institutions which distort this 
free market equilibrium are generally considered harmful and damaging the social welfare. 
Therefore deregulation, i.e. liberalization from regulations, or self-regulation has always been 
                                                                                                                                                        
same school. It was widely accepted up until the 1990s, when behavioral finance economists, who were a fringe 
element, became mainstream. 
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the war cry of orthodox market liberals in academia. To avoid institutional failures by any 
kind of collective market regulation the solution suggested by market radicals is always like a 
Buddhist mantra - let markets work it out by themselves or in French laissez-faire or laissez-
aller. That what you finally get if you keep to this simple rule is the social welfare optimum. 
Any interference via regulation to set prices or quantities leads to harmful results, i.e. welfare 
losses. 
From harmonia mundi of a general equilibrium in economics towards an evidence based 
economics supported by empirical experiments  
When asking for the origin of the general equilibrium principle and the idea of perfectness 
one should be aware that in the time when Adam Smith worked on his principles of 
economics in the second half the 18th century, in natural science the idea of harmony hidden 
as a godly secret was common in science of its time. Astronomers like Nicolas Kopernicus 
(1473 – 1543), Galileo Galilei (1564 - 1642) ,  Johannes Kepler (1571 – 1630) and Isaac 
Newton (1643 – 1727) had shown that with the heliocentric cosmology fundamental general 
laws of simplicity seemingly govern the planetary movements following the law of gravity. 
Revealing these intrinsic harmonies of the world was extended to other more mystic 
theological interpretations. This idea of a harmonious world dates even back to Greek 
philosophers like Phytagoras.  The invisible hand Smith invented to explain the hidden 
harmony behind the chaotic surface of everyday market processes is just an extension of this 
kind of thinking. 
Additionally Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, the famous German Mathematician and philosopher, 
expressed the belief that using differential calculus the future of the world is totally 
determined by a set of differential equations. He summarized his fundamental beliefs about 
the state of the world by the following seven principles: 
• Identity of indiscernibles. Two things are identical if and only if they share the same 
and only the same properties. Frequently invoked in modern logic and philosophy. The 
"identity of indiscernibles" is often referred to as Leibniz's Law. It has attracted the most 
controversy and criticism, especially from corpuscular philosophy and quantum mechanics. 
•  Sufficient reason. "There must be a sufficient reason [often known only to God] for 
anything to exist, for any event to occur, for any truth to obtain." 
• Pre-established harmony. "[T]he appropriate nature of each substance brings it about 
that what happens to one corresponds to what happens to all the others, without, however, 
their acting upon one another directly." (Discourse on Metaphysics, XIV) A dropped glass 
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shatters because it "knows" it has hit the ground, and not because the impact with the ground 
"compels" the glass to split. 
• Continuity. Natura non saltum facit. A mathematical analog to this principle would 
proceed as follows: if a function describes a transformation of something to which continuity 
applies, then its domain and range are both dense sets. 
• Optimism. "God assuredly always chooses the best. 
• Plenitude. "Leibniz believed that the best of all possible worlds would actualize every 
genuine possibility, and argued that this best of all possible worlds will contain all 
possibilities, with our finite experience of eternity giving no reason to dispute nature's 
perfection." 
Following this line of thought economics just applies these to the system of markets. Even 
Albert Einstein expressed skepticism against the new discipline of quantum mechanics built 
on plenty of violations of Leibnitz principles that god does not play dice. For many scientists 
it is inconceivable that we live in an imperfect world where a high degree of arbitrariness and 
indeterminacy rules. Market system has to be perfect at least in principle. Any economic 
theory violating this belief is a violation of the principle of good science. Market failure is 
therefore for most economists until nowadays not intrinsic, but caused by external 
intervention from outside. 
In astronomy and cosmology the belief that there is a cosmos governed by eternal laws has 
crumbled under the empirical evidence collected over the past two centuries. So nowadays 
cosmologists like Stephen Hawking claim that god must have played dice. The probabilistic 
nature of the universe, the uncertainty principle in quantum physics and Gödel’s proof (Gödel 
1931) that mathematical deductions cannot generally be decidable have changed the 
principles of good science quite a bit from those of Leibniz. However, it took and still takes 
the economics profession much pain to accept the imperfection of market systems. While 
perfect planning was ruled out as impossible for a whole economy, the capability of the 
market mechanism to deal with the coordination problems by the price mechanism as 
defended against all kinds of empirical refutations. The problem of intrinsic fallibility of free 
markets is up to now beyond the willingness to accept such possibility as a starting point for 
economic analysis. The painstaking efforts of theoretical mathematical economists to root out 
contradictions of their mathematical models about the perfect market system, however, ended 
all to often in dead ends where an axiomatic formulation of the market mechanism cannot be 
completely justified on the basis of pure mathematical logic. 
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Therefore it is not surprising that the pure logic approach has now more and more replaced by 
the empirical evidence based approach of experimental economics (see e.g. Smith 1976). If 
pure logic is insufficient to give truth about the human market behavior than only market 
experiments to test human behavior might get better insight into the problem of market 
behavior and dynamics. The problem with this research agenda is that it delivers much more 
counter evidence against the traditional efficient market model that it becomes difficult to 
derive a general model of human behavior opposite a market mechanism. Even if a human 
behavior is reproducible, i.e. by changing the individual participants of the experiment 
without getting significantly deviating results, the expected common behavior is not easily 
transferable to the uncontrolled environment of real market not the laboratory experiments. 
However, this conceptual change in the economics approach might help in the future to get 
more appropriate assumptions for economics as an empirical founded theory with the 
potential to derive from these results predictions with a higher degree of reliability. Not 
market optimism à la Leibniz should rule economics as a science but reproducible evidence 
from repeatable experiments. 
Allowing for all kind of market imperfections helps us to better understand the current 
financial market failures. To control unfettered markets so that booms and busts are less likely 
and less severe would be a major progress for the future of our financial market system. If 
money illusion just is a catch phrase for the inability of market participants to derive from 
financial market prices the necessary information to make sustainably consistent decision 
about the future, than one should not expect that financial markets could be efficient and 
perfect mechanism. Instead one would like Minsky suggested better hedge against such 
imperfections and failures to avoid the dramatic fall out, when a crisis happens. Imperfect 
financial markets need built in shock absorbers. Without such built-in stabilizers the economic 
system as whole is at risk. It is a long way from the belief in a perfect harmonious economic 
system towards one with significant imperfection and instabilities as an alternative research 
agenda in economics. 
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The problem of cheating in economics 
Intentions of all individual market participants to cheat about the correct pricing are excluded 
from the analytical framework of academic economic analysis. Because by assumption every 
market participant is as clever as any other the ability to successfully cheat – at least in the 
long-run – is controlled by the competitive mechanism. Those who are discovered as cheating 
will be punished by being stigmatized by the other market participants. Reputation of an 
honest business person is therefore always considered as something like an intangible asset. 
This symmetry assumption of reciprocity in behavioural possibilities is justified by the 
postulate of equal rights enshrined in the sovereignty of consumers and producers to act 
independently and on a level playing field. Individual freedom is represented by freedom of 
individual choice without taking disabilities in the knowledge and capabilities to act of real 
world people into account. What psychology knows as a fundamental property that people are 
different in their capabilities as a matter of fact is simply ignored by academic economists as a 
relevant factor to be considered in economic theories. Market failure in this sense – legal 
contracts based on misconceptions about the promised services and goods - is therefore 
beyond the scope of academic economic theory. This might be a severe short-coming in 
Western economic theory, because wisdom in the Chinese sense of embodying strategems 
(see e.g. von Senger 1993), i.e. cunningness, in human behavior play a central role in 
successful business plans. It is also present in everyday business practice but not a subject in 
theoretical analysis.  
Cheating customers, business partners and employees of the implications of their contracts is 
common practice at the real market place – one example is the Enron case2- , but it has no 
place in economic theory. Discovering the intentions of human behaviour is reduced to a 
simple nominalism. What people express as their intention is their true intention. There is no 
possible hidden agenda. The same nominalism is found in the theory of money values which 
excludes money illusion. However, in particular accounting is a crucial element to give 
                                                 
2
 Enron Corporation was an American energy company. Before its bankruptcy in late 2001, Enron employed 
approximately 22,000 staff and was one of the world's leading electricity, natural gas, communications and pulp 
and paper companies, with claimed revenues of nearly $101 billion in 2000. Fortune named Enron "America's 
Most Innovative Company" for six consecutive years. At the end of 2001 it was revealed that its reported 
financial condition was sustained substantially by institutionalized, systematic, and creatively planned 
accounting fraud, known as the "Enron scandal". Enron has since become a popular symbol of wilful corporate 
fraud and corruption. The scandal also brought into questions the accounting practices and activities of many 
corporations throughout the United States and was a factor in the creation of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. 
The scandal also affected the wider business world by causing the dissolution of the Arthur Andersen accounting 
firm. 
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transparency about the state of a business company. Bad accounting practices with the 
intention to hide bad assets and related losses from the public viewing are an essential element 
in the process of creating money illusion. Off-balance sheet operations is particular harmful 
because it hides risks for a company to its shareholders. The current banking crisis is not 
understandable if one neglects these methods of transferring dubious financial operations into 
special purpose vehicles (SPVs), conduits etc. (see e.g. Roubini, Mihm 2010). A shadow 
banking system which rapidly grew to a size endangering the whole financial services 
industry and evading supervision of regulatory authorities have become integral elements of 
the current financial industry and there is no end to this perceivable. But creative accounting 
practices have always been an origin of financial market crisis when they become known to 
the public and cause a crisis of confidence into single institutes or even in the whole industry. 
Money illusion of the public is therefore closely linked to the possibility of avoid 
transparency with regard to its shareholders, the regulators and the public in general. 
To reveal methods for discovering inconsistencies in the financial accounts of companies will 
be increasingly in high demand. Sometimes simple heuristics about fundamental relations 
help to understand or reveal dubious financial statements and discover fraud (see e.g. 
Gigerenzer, Todd 1999). Offering free lunches or extraordinary high returns on investments 
are always warning signs that the is a possibility of fraud related to this. So common sense 
often might help to avoid to be lured into a Ponzi scheme by cunning business people. One 
potential heuristic that makes us smart would be somewhat paradoxical to take the EMH as a 
benchmark. The theory states that there is no arbitrage possibility if financial markets are 
efficient. If rates of returns are higher in one investment than in another that could be only the 
result of different risk premiums, i.e. higher returns imply higher implicit risks of failure. 
Therefore risk-averse investors should choose assets taking into account the different risk-
premiums. This should raise suspicion about the hidden agenda are cheats which are tempting 
people to buy a safe assets with exceptional high returns. From the perspective of EMH 
therefore someone who promises exceptional high riskless profits is something impossible. To 
believe in these financial miracles is part of the overconfidence of many market participants 
that they consider they could outsmart the market, i.e. they have deeper insights than the 
ordinary market participants. That this is an ability not the norm but a rare exception is 
obvious. Furthermore many people always neglect that insider trading is much more often 
together with market maker capabilities the origin that constitute the basis for exceptional 
high profits from single investments. (see e.g. Malkiel 1996).  
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A good example is the Goldman Sachs/John Paulson fraud case. Goldman Sachs, the largest 
Wall Street investment bank, sold a securitized asset, Abacus. What they did not tell the 
public, was that Paulson’s company was involved of selecting the assets which later on was 
securitized under the Abacus mortgage backed security (MBS). Because Paulson knew about 
the internal weaknesses of the underlying assets, Paulson’s company later on bet on the 
default of the MBS-fund huge amounts against using credit default securities (CDS) in the 
derivative market, causing in a sense a self-fulfilling prophecy. Those institutional investors 
like Industrie Kredit Bank (IKB) in Germany and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) in the UK 
had to face dramatic losses. Goldman Sachs paid in a legal deal with the Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) 550 million US-Dollars to avoid a further investigation and 
prosecution in an official court case. IKB and RBS defaulted during the last global financial 
market turmoil and had to be saved by their respective governments.  
Similarly the hedge fund investors Raj Rajaratnam (Van Voris 2010) and Sir Allen Stanford 
(Watts 2009) were taken into remand by the FBI in June 2009 and October 2009 respectively 
because both are accused of massive insider trading and fraud charges by the SEC. The court 
cases against Raj Rajaratnam and Sir Allen Stanford on similar fraud charges are still 
pending. Both examples illustrate that tacit knowledge about companies and their future 
strategies or the underlying valuation problems of securized assets are sometimes an essential 
ingredient for huge profits earned in financial market speculation.  
Cheating about the willingness to repay debt, untrue promises about the potential returns of an 
investment, cooking the books in the accounting system, etc. are all empirical valid 
observations about human behavior in economic environments, but they have no place in 
economic theory. Such behaviour is considered irrelevant in economic theory construction. 
They are therefore simply ruled out by assumption.  
It took quite a while to make the study of imperfect markets a topic of the profession (see 
Robinson 1933; Chamberlain 1933) with the exception of the pure monopoly studied by 
Cournot (1838) and Bertrand (1883). Unfair price setting behaviour expressed through market 
power of suppliers which significantly deviate from the perfect competitive equilibrium prices 
which assume that prices are determined by the equality to the marginal cost of production 
have a role in the area of industrial economics (see e.g. Tirole 1988), but has always been 
considered as the exception from the rule of perfect competition. The oligopoly problem3, i.e. 
                                                 
3
 In Economics, an oligopoly is a market form in which a market or industry is dominated by a small number of 
sellers (oligopolists). Because there are few sellers, each oligopolist is likely to be aware of the actions of the 
others. The decisions of one firm influence, and are influenced by, the decisions of other firms. Strategic 
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the way a small number of suppliers establish a market equilibrium is still an unsolved topic 
in economic since than. There is no oligopolistic equilibrium which is a welfare optimum for 
a society. Due to scale and scope effects leading to economic of scale size of companies 
matter (Chandler 2004). This contributes to a higher market concentration in numerous 
markets. Furthermore network effects (see e.g. Farrell, Klemperer 2007) additionally support 
higher market concentration and a risk of diminished competition.  
However, as part of competition policy the degree of imperfection is always still measured by 
the benchmark of the perfect market equilibrium, i.e. the respective perfect equilibrium prices. 
Again there is a wide gap between a competition policy based on the orientation on perfect 
markets on the one hand and on the reality of competition policy on the other. On the latter 
pragmatism rules often derived from the legal profession and much less from economic 
theory. Any attempt to establish economic theories of perfect markets as the principle of legal 
decisions in competition law suits have been rejected or been unsuccessful when tried out in 
some exemplary cases. 
The legal profession which have to deal with issues of civil and public crimes, i.e. violation of 
laws, on a daily basis are much more familiar and willing to address this issue as cheating, 
rip-offs, swindle, etc. which is totally neglected in academic economic research. Deviant 
economic behaviour like those of Ponzi schemes4 practised people like Bernard Madoff5 are 
considered just as freaks of the system not the common everyday species we face in everyday 
day life in the economic sphere. They have to be considered a significant part of human nature 
in economic theory as well.  
                                                                                                                                                        
planning by oligopolists needs to take into account the likely responses of the other market participants. This 
makes the fable of the invisible hand à la Adam  Smith unconvincing. Coordination of few sellers in a market 
usually is only successful if it collectively puts the buyers at a disadvantage and the profits earned are share in a 
way which all side of the seller’s cartel accept as fair. This is hard to accomplish and price fixing is illegal due to 
anti-trust laws. 
4
 A Ponzi scheme is a fraudulent investment operation that pays returns to separate investors from their own 
money or money paid by subsequent investors, rather than from any actual profit earned. The Ponzi scheme 
usually entices new investors by offering returns other investments cannot guarantee, in the form of short-term 
returns that are either abnormally high or unusually consistent. The perpetuation of the returns that a Ponzi 
scheme advertises and pays requires an ever-increasing flow of money from investors to keep the scheme going. 
It is one potential origin for an investment bubble where asymmetric information between creditors and the 
debtor who set-up the Ponzi scheme attract a cumulative number of investors who believe in the validity of the 
business model of exceptional high returns. However, this promise is impossible to fulfil so that at some time the 
payout of the revenues to the investors collapse. When the investors discover that they are cheated its often to 
late to recover the money in invested in this kind of business. There is ample evidence that again and again 
Ponzi-schemes have been successfully implemented at a large scale at different times and countries causing 
major financial market crisis if the financial system was severely damaged (see e.g. Kindleberger 1978, Roubine, 
Mihm 2010). 
5
 Bernard Lawrence "Bernie" Madoff is an American former stock broker, investment adviser, non-executive 
chairman of the NASDAQ stock market, and the admitted operator of what has been described as the largest 
Ponzi scheme in history. 
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At the macroeconomic level the belief in EMH has also as a consequence that by this 
implicitly the existence of financial market bubbles is ruled out. Because of that most 
academic professionals in financial market analysis have very little to say if they are facing 
the phenomenon of financial market bubbles (see e.g. Roubini, Mihm 2010). Contrary to 
those who disbelieve the EMH – like  economists like Minsky (1982, 2008) who has early on 
pointed out that financial markets in particular have an inherent tendency of instability leading 
to recurrent financial markets crisis - the pre-dominant mainstreams at academia rejects this 
instability of financial market hypothesis (IMH.)  
Tricks and cheats used by economic agents in the everyday market process are from the 
perspective of most academic theorists just noise and a veil created to fail to discover the 
fundamental laws of market systems. This kind of framing however is misleading theoretical 
analysis by leaving key elements of financial market failure out of sight. So it is common 
practice not to study any kind of deviant economic behavior as a research topic in economics. 
However, the impact such deviant behaviour even can cause on the macro level of whole 
economies or even the global economy is too important to be ignored as an ancillary factor in 
the whole economic system. The selection bias to focus on behaviour which guarantees 
market efficiency outcomes leads to severe problems to assess and predict real world market 
events governed by booms and busts. What Minsky was well aware of, is that fraud and 
cheating is common practice in a market economy. If regulatory oversight is to negligent or 
even regulatory capture takes hold in the supervisory institutions the incentive to create high 
personal income through financial market manipulation takes overhand. So contrary to the 
free marketers or radical market liberals Minsky suggested a strict system of effective 
oversight and rules which makes these kinds of activities at least more risky if not impossible. 
To have more efficient financial markets one has to accept that inherent inefficiency of self-
governing markets. This kind of perception of Minsky is also more in line with actual 
economic theories of crime (see e.g. Eide, Rubin and Shepherd 2006). If human nature is to a 
large extent driven by greed to get rich, than it needs a Leviathan to keep this greediness 
under control especially in financial markets. One central element of a governance structure 
has to be proper accounting rules and transparency of financial markets. Furthermore it needs 
credible punishments for violating the regulations of good financial market governance. 
Crime without punishment to deter misbehaviour is an essential element of the economic of 
crime analysis. 
In this sense economic theory based on the EMH is a Neo-Platonic philosophy where the pure 
idea about markets should not be spoiled by the impure evidence in the real world of market 
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processes. The market ideal is the essence or true nature of all observable empirical markets. 
Those who fail to see the beauty of the essence of the market system are just ignorant and 
infidel about the fundamental truth about a market economy. They are puzzled by the surface 
of everyday market events with all kinds of imperfections and ignorant about the essence of 
the market process, the ideal market system. This dogmatism resists any kind of open debate 
according to counterfactual evidence. 
Human behaviour in economic interactions 
The further fundamental fallacy in the theory of individual economic behaviour rests on the 
assumption that it is restricted to simple behavioural rules of a market exchange game. This 
makes the analytical treatment easier, but excludes many behavioural possibilities which are 
common to human practice. 
Standard economic theory is based on maximising or minimising continuous differentiable 
functions under constrains, e.g. utility, cost or profits. It neglects information uncertainty 
problems associated with the functional structure and parameterisation. Instead of using at 
least probabilistic distributions to catch the uncertainty about the state of an economic system 
one reduces this problem via the certainty-equivalence-principle (CEP) by using rational 
expectations as a sufficient indicator for economic analysis and reduces the randomness of 
economic processes to a simple error or noise process. Under the CEP the traditional 
analytical results are easily transferred beyond their traditional framework of deterministic 
analysis using the classical calculus as its analytical instrument together with the expectation 
value operator.  
What often is designed in the Marshallian tradition of partial analysis (Marshall 1890) is 
extended as well into the general equilibrium analysis which deals with a simultaneous multi-
market equilibrium in the tradition of Léon Walras (Walras 1874). However, this raises the 
problem of multiple-equilibria which was ruled out for quite some time as inadequate in 
theoretical economic analysis until it finally get its academic acceptance in the economic 
literature (see e.g. Diamond 1987). This is another challenge of indeterminacy of an economic 
system. Before the general equilibrium literature was obsessed to establish conditions of a 
unique general equilibrium. Multiple equilibria were considered degenerated cases where 
artificial restrictions imposed on the market system led to such perverse results. The political 
treatment is to remove the unwarranted restrictions and the unique and perfect general 
equilibrium prevails. Again it was a major financial market crisis in the emerging economies 
which stimulated research on the possibility of multiple-equilibria (see e.g. Masson 2001). It 
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seems crisis in economic reality is always a good teacher to dismiss long hold prejudices 
enshrined into axioms used in economic theory. If the dominant theory fails to explain and 
predict a current economic event the willingness to accept more “exotic” theory elements 
increases significantly. The unpredicted real world crisis by economic theories induces a 
reform in the theoretical framework in economic theories, at least sometimes. 
In the simplest market clearing bargaining game the assumptions are set in way that only 
prices or quantities offered matter and a contract has to be done by both parties. In a sequence 
of bid and rejections of different offers the bargaining process converges towards a bargaining 
equilibrium a contract where a certain amount at the final bargaining equilibrium price is 
exchanged. Of cause the logic of such a simple bargaining game is convincing, but it does not 
ask questions of changing the bargaining framework conditions.  
As Akerlof has demonstrated in his market for lemons example (Akerlof 1970) if there is 
uncertainty on the buyers-side about the quality of the product the seller-buyer-equilibrium 
will fail to meet the conventional equilibrium price setting rules. So the problem in economic 
analysis is to define the rules of a game properly to match those of possible human strategic 
behaviour. If one omits possible actions of an economic agents just to get a simpler and 
mathematical easier tractable model one runs the high risk to fail human actions because it 
will extent the rules of the game by changing the rules itself. One stratagem in the lemon 
market case is the lack of the buyer to know sufficiently well about the quality of the product, 
e.g. a used car. If the seller is unwilling to reveal his information advantage and there is a lack 
of trust in the honesty of the salesman, than the bargaining fails even if the simpler standard 
model of efficient bargaining would predict a successful trade at an equilibrium price. 
So the lesson to be learned is that many economic theories are based on assumptions which 
cannot be matching the real world environment. Reality refutes assumptions in many 
dimensions to invalidate the theory based predictions. Theories and mathematical models 
cannot match the real world outcome because they ignore important behavioural possibilities 
of the respective agents. False prediction of behaviour is the outcome of false and too narrow 
restrictions about the possible human behavioural space. If one bases its predictions on the 
validity of fair play rules ignoring the willingness of agents to break these rules when they 
perceive a potential benefit from it, theoretical predictions become invalid.  
So the thorough explicit listing on the assumptions necessary to obtain analytical results 
should be an essential ingredient for academic scientific research in economics, but this is far 
less common practice as one should expect. Often essential restricting axioms are not revealed 
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with the intention to give the theory the impression of a high degree of generality which for 
the well trained academic economist if obviously not the case. Limited validity of a theory 
together with seemingly generality communicated to the less well trained public often 
severely bias decisions in favour towards a theoretical model which cannot stand the test of 
reality. What we need in economics are realistic assumptions about human behaviour to 
derive realistic conclusions.  
Academic economists often cheat willingly the general public about their general 
understanding of economic phenomena under investigation. Because of their reputation as 
scientists who are experts to know much more than the general public they simply impose 
their prejudices based on imperfect models and analysis in the general political debate. 
Everybody knows about the willingness to cheat to obtain desired results from early 
childhood on. However, when we deal with economics as a theoretical discipline we simply 
ignore this important dimension of human behaviour. Another possibility is wishful thinking 
to construct a logical deduction omitting important alternatives from our decision tree.  
A good example is the stagflation phenomenon. Until it emerged after the two oil price shocks 
in the late 1970s and 1980s, no economist trained in the Phillips-curve (Phillips 1958) would 
have considered the simultaneous coexistence of high inflation with persistent output 
recession or at least stagnation as possible. Reality told academic economists a lesson about 
possibilities of economic development which lay beyond their imagination based on a trade-
off between unemployment and inflation. After the world economy recovered from stagflation 
the interest in studying the subject in academia veined and might probably become a hot topic 
in the near future because the current global recession policies of easy monetary and 
unsustainable fiscal policies are insufficient to establish a sustainable economic recovery. 
If the reality refutes the predicted outcome there are a lot of ways to justify why one – the 
expert – could not know about certain circumstances enough to give a policy recommendation 
which results in the predicted outcome. We failed because we had in information problem, is s 
stratagem to justify ones failure. Insufficient consideration of potential outcomes is one key 
element in the self-excuse stratagems.  
(include the queen Elizabeth debate in Britain here) 
“We could not know that this could happen because it never happened before,” is one way to 
excuse the inability to give reliable predictions.  
“Something or someone has broken the rules of the game” is another way to justify failure to 
predict successfully the outcome by the academic profession in economics. 
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Taking the current global financial market crisis gives lots of examples for explaining away 
the failure to assess and predict the current catastrophic outcome. 
Financial Markets, the Future and Uncertainty 
In the simple illustration of general equilibrium or partial equilibrium models the efficient 
market equilibrium is simply determined as if only the present demand and supply matter. 
However, every economist would easily accept that this is a major oversimplification about 
the economic problem of production, allocation and consumption of goods and services using 
money as medium of exchange. It is the future that matters and the expectation about the 
future development is essential for what is going to happen on spot markets today. Without 
taking this interconnectedness between present and future into account most of the analytical 
results based on a pure spot market mechanism will fail. 
However, one fundamental problem about the future is that it is more or less uncertain. Frank 
H. Knight (1921) was right when he clearly separated the problem of uncertainty from risk. 
Uncertainty includes not a randomness of events which can be represented by a random 
variable with a specific probability distribution but embodies the model uncertainty about the 
probability distribution itself. Classical parametric statistical methods however are based on 
the necessity that the underlying probability distribution is known and use estimation 
functions to determine the respective parameters to be able to make inferences about the 
riskiness of possible future events. Some well trained econometrician will claim that on the 
one hand the central limit theorem of inference6 helps to avoid the exact knowledge the exact 
probability distribution because at least asymptotically the distribution of the expectation 
value converges against the normal distribution. If the random sample of a particular 
economic random variable is sufficiently large enough and the single observations are 
identically and independently distributed the particular distribution function does not matter if 
one wants to draw only inferences about the expectation value of the random variable. 
Furthermore one can use non-parametric methods of inferences (see e.g. Hettmansprenger, 
McKean 1998). But this does not change the underlying fundamental problem that 
observations should be obtained from the same underlying distribution and that the single 
observations are independently distributed from each other. If the underlying distribution 
function constantly changes over time one has at least to make assumption about this 
                                                 
6
 In probability theory, the central limit theorem (CLT) states conditions under which the mean of a sufficiently 
large number of independent random variables, each with finite mean and variance, will be approximately 
normally distributed. 
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dependency structure before one can draw conclusions using estimation functions about the 
future outcome in particular of the expectation values. Not knowing about the changing risk 
interdependencies of financial assets in securitized papers was one cause why the whole 
securitized asset market finally collapsed. If the default of one real estate has significant 
impacts on another and this causes a contagion process, the simple independency assumption 
underlying the securitization models about the risk structure fails. 
In economics one has become well aware that there exists a problem of path-dependency7 in 
economic development (see e.g. Arthur 1994). Since the current state of a society is the result 
of past decisions the current state depends on a sequence of past choices so that the present 
state is not independent from the past or as a catch phrase says: history matters. But not only 
the past matters but the future expectation about future trends and developments matter as 
well. In particular in the area of investments into any kind of asset the expected rate of return 
is essential for the valuation of the respective asset. Present values are always calculated by 
using the expected rate of return to discount the future income stream of the asset. Since the 
expected rate of return is more or less uncertain the problem of uncertainty enters the market 
mechanism via this channel. Furthermore the discounting of future income streams of an asset 
causes a significant compound interest effect which becomes increasing dominant with the 
length of the respective time horizon of the asset under consideration. On top of this there is 
empirical evidence that humans tend to deviate from the standard discounting procedure and 
follow more a hyperbolic discounting approach (Thaler 1961, Aisnlie 1975). This, however, 
leads to time inconsistent decision making. 
The information problem some one has to solve under such circumstances is tremendous. To 
get a reasonable outcome one has to know the complete income stream in advance together 
with the correct expected rate of return and take into account that the realisation of all this 
variables faces some degree of uncertainty in its realisation. If the predictions are incorrect the 
market mechanism has to adjust for this miscalculation. The larger the bias forecast has been 
the more dramatic the adjustment which after a certain threshold level might be considered an 
adjustment shock. If major unpredicted events in the near future or perceptions about future 
developments afterwards happen, this has significant consequences on the present value of the 
respective asset. This makes asset markets much more fragile with regard to the volatility of 
the asset prices than ordinary commodity markets. Since investments into a real asset like a 
                                                 
7
 Path dependency explains how the set of decisions one faces for any given circumstance is limited by the 
decisions one has made in the past, even though past circumstances may no longer be relevant. 
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machine or real estate also has as a consequence a lock-in effect, it cannot be converted to 
another form into  a liquid assets or only at significant costs, this makes those markets most 
vulnerable to revaluation problems. The new financial innovation of asset backed securities 
just created easy liquidity without risk to assets which a re intrinsically illiquid. The intrinsic 
riskiness of the underlying assets like real estate or entitlements on the future income stream 
of debtors like households, however, face the revaluation problem under uncertainty 
depending on conditions of the overall economy not under the individual control of the people 
who sign the contracts. 
This problem becomes even more significant if we take into account the Schumpeterian view 
(Schumpeter 1911) that economic development is a process of creative destruction through 
innovations. Since the predictability of innovations is highly limited, any major innovation, 
i.e. a general purpose innovation (GPI)8, causes major revaluation shocks in the asset markets. 
Therefore it is no accident that innovations like the rapid developments in ICTs and in 
particular of the internet with its network effects or the innovation of securitization as a mean 
to distribute risk have become a source of huge volatility in the associated asset prices in 
particular and changed the economic growth and income expectations of the whole global 
society. If the visionary expectations would have been correct the social income stream of the 
future would have increased dramatically (see e.g. Jorgenson, Stiroh 2000). 
At the centre is always an event which is a certain type of innovation. The general public 
starts to speculate about the high positive impacts this innovation, e.g. a discovery of a new 
continent like the South Sea, a new general purpose technology (see e.g. Helpman 1998) like 
the Internet or securitization as mean to disperse risk and those involved in this type of 
activities start to act as visionaries who promise extremely high revenues from this new kind 
of activities. Since they often lack the money to finance endeavours to internalise the 
perceived high profits exclusively they offer others the one time opportunity to participate and 
earn a significant share of the high profits. People who otherwise have to work hard to make 
their money become attracted by such easy to get rich opportunity and often use large 
amounts of their savings to spend them on the seemingly safe bet of some investors. They 
highly advertise their too good to be missed opportunity. If they are crooks they take a hit and 
run stratagem to flee with all the money the got before the stupid financiers discover the 
                                                 
8
 I prefer the term general purpose innovation instead of general purpose technology because it includes all kind 
of major innovations which not necessarily have to be technology based. Securitization is not a technological 
innovation in the narrow sense, but it had a dramatic impact on the financial market system and by this on the 
economic as a whole. 
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fraud. Sometimes it might even happen that the one that runs the doomed business is so much 
convinced about its success that they become their own victim. Ventura capital financing is all 
about this problem. After all the perspective to get effortless rich is a common feature of all 
major scams. Money lies around and you only have to pick it up. This mirage of financial 
market prophets is a key driver for building-up communities of believers which create a 
financial market bubble. The symptoms of this kind of irrational exuberance are well known 
(see e.g. Kindleberger 1978, Greenspan 1996, Shiller 2000).  
However, it has become a stratagem for policy makers responsible for financial market 
supervision to claim that financial market bubbles are unpredictable. There might be some 
truth to it, if one expects unconditional prediction which matches the real outcome perfectly. 
Of cause there is intrinsic uncertainty about the future, so that it is impossible to make the 
claim that the nearer or further off future the state of an economy might be predicted with 
certainty.  
Afterall, there are often indications which make the claim that there is a financial market 
bubble emerging which are reasonably safe to take early action on (see e.g. Shiller 2000, 
Roubini, Mihm 2010, Chap 1 & 2.). People who have kept their animal spirits alive know that 
certain financial market trends are unsustainable and a correction to break an unsustainable 
trend is needed. But there is a difficulty to give an exact plan how and by how much policy 
intervention are bubble can be deflated in a way to assure a soft landing.  
Even more so it is too much to expect a perfect bubble deflation policy based on a perfect 
model about the financial market bubble currently emerging. It this simply this overblown 
expectation at policy makers to justify their policy actions that leads to a laissez-faire attitude 
in the end. One refrains from doing something because one fears the blame game when 
market participants will proclaim that this action was unnecessary and harmful.  
Those who are making a fortune as long as the bubble expands will always be those who can’t 
see the dark clouds on the horizon emerging. As long as the party is rolling they say they just 
have to be opportunistic because otherwise their shareholders would make them responsible 
for lost incomes if their prediction were wrong. This kind of harmful herding behaviour 
creates a kind of vicious circle of ruthlessness even if one already knows that things will 
collapse sooner or later. Pre-emptive bubble pricking is therefore something monetary policy 
makers have declared as a taboo on their policy agenda. John Paulson and many other 
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speculators are less scrupulous when they learn about an unsustainable financial position, see 
.e.g. the recent Greek sovereign default crisis.  
Facing the dilemma of too early too much opposite too later too little, those responsible for 
financial market supervision have decided for the second option. Pre-emptive bubble pricking 
is still a taboo. This end-of-pipe attitude – first let the bubble burst and than fix the failing 
system again – might be the worst choice taking the opportunity costs of both strategies into 
account. This is a harmful attitude which cost the society dearly in the end as the enormous 
amounts of tax payer’s money spent for bailouts illustrate.  
Probably the truth lies between the two extremes of the white (Roubine, Mihm 2010) and 
black swan. (Taleb 2007). Our knowledge about emerging bubbles is sufficiently large 
enough to know that it is a light grey swan and the longer the bubble grows the darker the 
grey swan becomes until it is pitch black.  
Uncertain future developments, false predictions and cheap talk 
As we have seen in the previous two sections future developments affecting market valuations 
embody a prediction error problem plus the possibility of cheating about the seriousness of 
the predictions presented to the public. This creates an identification problem. Can you trust 
the predictions made by some business people or political institutions that are stakeholders in 
the respective businesses or have for the latter a hidden agenda for example re-election? 
In economics one is aware of the possibility of cheap talk (see e.g. Farell, Rabin 1996, 
Crawford, Sobel 1982) as a means of signalling something different than the actual wording 
given in the statement himself. Furthermore as false prophets often do the predictions are 
sufficiently vague to give room for interpretation. Talk of politicians addressing the public 
often intentionally gives only highly imperfect predictions but in a way that their constituency 
fill in the information gaps with their own hopes and aspirations. The audience reads between 
the lines by confabulation what the wish to hear. So the dissemination of information through 
the media might be highly biased in many respects. Newspapers and news services are often 
as well not impartial in the presentation of information (see e.g. Herman, Chomsky 1988). 
Therefore the issue of credibility of information is another critical issue in the valuation 
problems of markets. Since financial markets are heavily dependent on information in 
particular about the future, i.e. prediction markets, the constant stream of contradictory 
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information spread needs a high capability to filter relevant from irrelevant or false 
information and propaganda. Since the ancient Greek philosophy the art of rhetoric9 has been 
in high esteem. A well trained speaker in rhetoric could accomplish to convince a greater 
audience with his arguments even if they are misleading from the rational choice principles. 
Sophism10 - in the interpretation of Plato - has become a way still nowadays to influence 
peoples thinking not to help them understand the real state but instead to trick them into 
common fallacies for a specific advantage. Often in financial markets sophists tend to 
convince people by their cunning rhetoric into to their faulty businesses. This phenomenon of 
mass psychology contributes significantly for developments in financial markets crisis und 
financial bubbles. Ponzi schemes tend to use those peoples with this special talent again and 
again. This however shows exemplary that the symmetry assumption about ability to make 
rational choices differ in the population. The smart guys trick the stupid ones often using 
again and again the same tricks. 
The same is sometimes true for economic policies. Theories are invented out of the blue to 
justify irresponsible economic policies. A good example is the Laffer curve11, which state that 
tax income losses to the government by lowering tax rates would be overcompensated by the 
increase in taxation due to higher taxable private incomes. This spontaneous suggestion about 
the working of an economy became a lynch pin of the Reaganomics policy of the 1980s. Later 
on the budget director, David Stockman (Stockman 1988), called this approach Vodoo 
Economics. This insider-outsider-problem of those who know that what they are doing is pure 
propaganda for a false policy design is another essential element for misguiding public policy 
opinion by experts who know better. Stockman disbelieved the strategy of the Reagan 
administration but as long as in office he used his rhetoric capabilities to convince the public 
that it might work wonders. It didn’t as we now know, but at the time being it worked to cheat 
                                                 
9
 Rhetoric is the art of using language to communicate effectively. It involves three audience appeals: logos, 
pathos, and ethos, as well as the five canons of rhetoric: invention or discovery, arrangement, style, memory, and 
delivery. 
10
 Sophism can mean two very different things: In the modern definition (from Plato), a sophism is a specious 
argument used for deceiving someone. In Ancient Greece, the sophists were a category of teachers who 
specialized in using the tools of philosophy and rhetoric  for the purpose of teaching aretê — excellence, or 
virtue — predominately to young statesmen and nobility. 
11
 The story of how the Laffer curve got its name begins with a 1978 article by Jude Wanniski in The Public 
Interest entitled, "Taxes, Revenues, and the 'Laffer Curve.'"1 As recounted by Wanniski (associate editor of The 
Wall Street Journal at the time), in December 1974, he had dinner with me (G.E. Arthur Laffer then professor at 
the University of Chicago), Donald Rumsfeld (Chief of Staff to President Gerald Ford), and Dick Cheney 
(Rumsfeld's deputy and my former classmate at Yale) at the Two Continents Restaurant at the Washington Hotel 
in Washington, D.C. While discussing President Ford's "WIN" (Whip Inflation Now) proposal for tax increases, 
I supposedly grabbed my napkin and a pen and sketched a curve on the napkin illustrating the trade-off between 
tax rates and tax revenues. Wanniski named the trade-off "The Laffer Curve."  
see http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2004/06/The-Laffer-Curve-Past-Present-and-Future  
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the public. The current unsustainable public deficit position of the US government just 
continues the bad fiscal policies of the US governments of the past 30 years (see e.g. Erber, 
Weber, Rudoph 2009). There can be no doubt about the fiscal unsustainability of the US 
federal budget planning for the coming years.   
If the general public gets increasingly doubtful that previously believed prediction or 
scenarios about future developments are still valid, this could cause an information cascade of 
revaluations12. These reflect themselves in the financial market prices often quite 
dramatically. The financial market panics observed when a bubble bursts is just this kind of 
contagion effect created by the spread of new true or false information. This changes the 
valuation of assets accordingly. 
Fiat money and seignorage 
Fiat money has different meanings. It is any money declared by a government to be legal 
tender, but since there is no intrinsic value associated to it anymore it can be created without 
any real valued assets like gold or silver in the past.13 Therefore it even does not need a 
creation of money by the printing bank notes or coins to circulate as means of payment. It is 
just sufficient that the central bank decides to accept other assets in exchange for offering a 
virtual amount of legal tender on the central bank account. A commercial bank exchanges 
other assets which lack this legal tender property with the central bank and obtain central bank 
money instead. This they can use than to make any payments to other customers. Similarly a 
government can swap government bonds in exchange for fiat money of the central bank. 
Since the central bank by issuing fiat money has in principle an obligation opposite the holder 
of such money it has to take care to be able to offer the holder of fiat money another asset in 
exchange on demand. However, the value of the fiat money is unfixed with respect to the 
potential assets. Money illusion emerges simply emerges if people would expect that the 
value of money is stable, i.e. the purchasing power is not affected in particular by high 
inflation. By keeping inflation under control the fiat money is accepted as a reasonable store 
of value. A central bank losing their credibility for keeping inflation under control is putting 
their fiat money holdings as store of value at risk. This would find its empirical expression in 
a higher velocity of circulation of fiat money because people dismiss this kind of money as 
                                                 
12
 An information (or informational) cascade occurs when people observe the actions of others and then make the 
same choice that the others have made, independently of their own private information signals. Because it is 
usually sensible to do what other people are doing, the phenomenon is assumed to be the result of rational 
choice. Nevertheless, information cascades can sometimes lead to arbitrary or even erroneous decisions. (see e.g. 
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992). 
13
 The Song Dynasty in China was the first to issue true paper money, jiaozi, around the 10th century. 
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inadequate as a proper store of value. So fiat money has the intrinsic problem that its function 
as a store of value is only possible if inflation is kept under control. Fiat money has therefore 
a higher risk to end up in hyperinflations if governments and their central banks use this as a 
means to fulfill debt obligations to the public (see e.g. Cagan 1956). 
If central banks change their commitment on price stability somewhere in the future people 
will tend to adjust for this loss of functionality by using other assets in exchange for this 
purpose. So money illusion emerges as a fact in the perception of the public, when the central 
bank does not uphold their commitment of price stability. Since the information about this 
policy shift might dissipate unevenly to the public this process will not happen 
instantaneously. Insiders might adjust more rapidly than outsiders so that distributional effects 
cannot be ruled out, putting outsiders at a disadvantage. 
Since most of the central bank money created is needed by the financial markets fiat money is 
similar to a permanent loan of the public to the central bank. Because of this limited 
obligation money creation gives the central bank a surplus which is also called seignorage. 
Seignorage is the interest earned on the assets acquired in exchange for the fiat money. These 
revenues are similar to a tax for the supply of liquidity of fiat money paid by the private 
sector. If bank notes or coins are issued these costs have to be subtracted from the overall 
seignorage of the central bank for the public. Since the central bank is an institution of the 
government at least some parts of the seignorage is transferred to the government as transfer 
payment. Since central banks who buy assets in exchange for paying with fiat money they 
have to value these assets according to common accounting principle like least value principle 
as used for foreign currencies or gold to hedge against potential losses and built up reserves in 
the case there is demand in particular high demand for foreign currencies as has happened 
during the recent Euro-crisis in 2010. My using mark to market valuation the central bank 
could face a higher volatility in their assets valuations depending on the market situation for 
these assets. To constrain these negative effects the central banks like the ECB usually 
accepted assets with a high triple AAA rating which are considered the most safe assets 
hedged against high market volatility in their asset prices. However, this behavioral rule has 
been temporarily abolished during the current global financial crisis putting the balance sheet 
of central banks at risk to end up with huge losses or even could face insolvency when the 
central bank assets are devalued that the own capital is not covering the losses of buying bad 
assets from the commercial banks to stabilize the financial sector. 
Up to now this has not endangered the credibility of major central banks of the Fed, ECB, the 
Bank of England or the Japanese central bank to guarantee price stability; however, this might 
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change if governments get more and more highly indebted. Fears of sovereign debt failures 
are significant triggers for the change of the public perception about the solidity of the 
respective fiat money issued by the central bank of that country or respective currency union 
like the Eurozone. 
Seignorage under international financial market integration 
In an international financial market integration regime – i.e. under a regime without capital 
market controls – seignorage incomes not only emerge from the domestic private sector but as 
well from the foreign countries, if they hold currency reserves of the fiat money of a particular 
country like the US or the Eurozone as a currency union. These global reserve currencies earn 
significant benefits from the willingness to hold huge currency reserves of these currencies to 
hedge against a major currency crisis to avoid insolvency, see e.g. the case recent of Island, 
where insolvency could only be avoided through financial life lines given by the IMF and 
foreign governments. The insolvency risk of in particular small countries which lack the 
ability to finance foreign debt in their own currency denomination includes the currency 
illusion if a major financial crisis emerges in the international financial markets. Therefore the 
loss of credibility of a domestic government and its central bank to maintain sufficient price 
stability tends to drive their population towards other currencies as a more reliable store of 
value. This kind of Dollarization or Euroization transfers the Seignorage revenues of the 
countries holding the reserve international currencies to the respective foreign countries in 
particular the US as the still dominant global reserve currency (see e.g. Feige, Dean 2002).  
 
Figure 1 – Official Global Dollarization and Euroization 
 
Worldwide use of the U.S. dollar and the euro:  
     United States  
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     External adopters of the US dollar  
     Currencies pegged to the US dollar  
     Currencies pegged to the US dollar within narrow band  
     Eurozone   
     External adopters of the euro  
     Currencies pegged to the euro  
     Currencies pegged to the euro within narrow band 
 
The huge amount of dollar exchange reserves accumulated in particular in Asian countries 
like the PR of China, Japan or oil producing countries like Saudi Arabia over the past decade 
has become a very expensive hedge against the potential risk of a currency crisis (see table 1 
below). These few holders account for more than 60% of total world foreign currency 
reserves. The adequacy of the foreign exchange reserves is more often expressed not as an 
absolute level, but as a percentage of short-term foreign debt, money supply, or average 
monthly imports. 
 
Table 1 – Major countries official holdings of US-Dollar currency reserves 
Rank Country  Billion USD (end of month) 
1 
 People's Republic of China (China) note 1 June 2010  2,454.3 
2 
 Japan  June 2009  1,019.0 
 
 Eurozone  Oct 2009  716.0 
3 
 Russia note 2  Apr 2010  456.0 
4 
 Republic of China (Taiwan) Apr 2010 357.6 
5 
 India note 2  Mar 2010  277.0 
6 
 South Korea  Nov 2009  270.9 
7 
 Switzerland note 3 May 2010  262.0 
8 
 Brazil note 4 Jun 2010  253.5 
9 
 Hong Kong Nov 2009  240.0 
10 
 Singapore  May 2010  203.4 
11  Germany  Sep 2009  184.0 
Source: IMF and national central banks 
Notes 
1. China updates its information quarterly. 
2. Russia and India update their information weekly and monthly. 
3. Swiss National Bank's currency reserves leapt more than 50 per cent from $145.6bn in 
April to $261.9bn in May 2010 
4. Brazil updates its information daily. 
If the US would lose its credibility to maintain monetary stability domestic and even more so 
foreign currency holders might rush for an exit and by this defuse the currency illusion with 
regard to exchange rate stability very quickly. Exchange rate volatility is therefore an 
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indicator for credibility problems between different countries- Up to now the US-Dollar has 
profited from such developments as a safe haven for international investors under periods of 
global financial crisis. If the US-Dollar would lose this extraordinary privilege because of 
increasing doubt in the solvency of the US-government it could trigger major turbulences in 
the global financial market system (see e.g. Roubini, Mihm 2010, Chapter 10). Especially 
after the current global financial market crisis which has had its origin in the securitization of 
huge amounts of dubious assets like mortgages for subprime customers (see e.g. Shiller 
2008), but also in many other areas which heavily used consumer credit later collateralized in 
CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) as a mean for stimulating and financing an excessive 
consumer demand (see e.g. Roubini, Mihm 2010, Chap. 4), have created a huge legacy of 
toxic assets which led to the bailout of major investment and commercial banks in particular 
in the US and Europe.  
Easy credit helped to create money illusion by many debtors that they have not to face a 
restrictive budget constraint. Rapidly rising housing prices over many years contributed to the 
belief that in case of financial troubles house owners could easily obtain liquidity from their 
real estate without facing significant losses. When the housing bubble burst these expectations 
about a sound financing and manageable risk in case of liquidity problems to pay back 
mortgages lost its credibility and the investments in private housing ran into bankruptcy due 
to the contagion effects of fire sales to obtain at least some money back from the real estate 
under a scenario of rapidly sinking housing prices. 
So money illusion has had in this case its origin in asset price inflation triggered by low 
interest rates. One origin was a loose monetary policy of the Fed in the US which under its 
previous Chairman Alan Greenspan helped to fight the negative impact of a previously burst 
new economy bubble. Another was the possibility to use financial innovations created in the 
investment and commercial banking sector to distribute risks of risky assets around the globe 
by cheating about this riskiness against the naïve buyers of from rating agencies like Standard 
& Poor’s, Moody’s or Fitch highly rated triple AAA securitized assets like mortgage backed 
securities (MBOs) about the potential liquidity and valuation risks inherent in these papers.14 
                                                 
14
 See e.g. the newspaper articles “US credit rating agencies 'a colossal failure' in the Independent from October 
23, 2008.  The newspaper makes the quotation:  "The rating agencies broke this bond of trust, and federal 
regulators ignored the warning signs and did nothing to protect the public," said Waxman, a California 
Democrat. "The result is that our entire financial system is now at risk." The statement of the rating agencies  
when the lawmakers criticised the three largest credit rating agencies for their role in the worst financial crisis in 
decades, that they claimed  they didn't see it coming. Well this might be always true in the sense that people 
there spend little time to use their imagination to consider stress tests similar to the real events as a realistic 
assumption for their rating process. Again overconfidence in the stability of the financial markets was an 
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Above normal market interest rates offerings for these assets attracted private and institutional 
investors who were blindfolded because they trust the reputation of the issuers of such assets 
like e.g. Lehman Brothers and the quality of ratings of similarly well established rating 
agencies. Since there is now lot’s of evidence available that insiders of this Ponzi scheme 
were well aware about the intrinsic vulnerability of the complexity financial products, it is 
ample proof that moral hazard has been a core element of the market failure in this segment of 
the financial markets. High bonus payments for sales of such assets for the investment 
bankers reduced any self-restraint to avoid a disastrous imbalance between the real value and 
the nominal value of such assets.  
Conclusions 
The lesson to be learned is that money illusion has many different causes all associated with 
the common fact that money as an accounting unit for market values cannot signal the 
information about the underlying value problems in a proper way. This is contrary to Hayek’s 
belief that market prices are sufficient statistics to convey all necessary information needed to 
make a decision (Hayek 1945). If the pricing mechanism is flawed because it cannot signal in 
particular future valuation problem properly, the conversion of all valuations into an 
accounting unit of fiat money makes thing even worse. The exact numbers tend to mislead 
economic agents to give them a degree of certainty which cannot stand-up to the riskiness 
intrinsically embodies in the dynamics of markets where demand and supply driven 
adjustments are taking place without questioning the efficiency of the market prices as proper 
instrument to gear the production and allocation of resources. 
If false trading is possible then even according to orthodox market liberals misallocation and 
wrong decision take place. Since this error is not immediately visible to the naïve observer or 
trader they draw wrong conclusions from the current outcomes. A lucky outcome of a 
speculation is reinterpreted as deep insight into the function of the economy or specific 
market trends. The belief to have learned a lesson how to play the markets changes the 
willingness to take risk because the risk awareness is numbed by the current lucky streak of 
favourable events. The subjective risk perception deviates more and more from the objective 
risk associated with the current market trend. Even if early on signs show-up that things could 
                                                                                                                                                        
essential ingredient to avoid a deeper questioning about potential risk scenarios. Putting the benchmark tests low, 
the models used in securitization did not reveal a significant risk that could make such papers toxic. 
Complacency based on past successful performances changed to willingness to accept risks into the false 
direction. Such false conclusions are common in human behavior when expectations about future risk are just 
based on a short-term of  past performances (see e.g. Lowenstein 2000).  
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turn into the opposite direction in the near future, people often tend to develop a selective 
perception about the information available. One is looking for positive evidence that support 
the current prejudice and less for evidence which would falsify the maintained hypothesis 
how things are. So many critics of the high-risk and problems already visible in the financial 
system before the last global financial bubble burst were ignored and talked down (see e.g. 
Roubini, Mihm 2010, Chap. 1). Contrary to Taleb (2007) who used the catch word black swan 
to claim that financial crisis are a very rare events, Roubini calls the current financial market 
crisis a white swan. It has nothing which went beyond common knowledge about how 
financial market crisis developed in the past. Same, same but different – a Thai saying – could 
be said about the stylized facts of a major financial market crisis. 
What the author hopes to have illustrated by the present paper is that the two extreme beliefs, 
i.e. that there is a possibility of perfect planning or that there is the possibility of perfect 
markets to solve the coordination problem of economic activities are definitely wrong. They 
are both ideological constructs which emerged at a time when socialist and capitalist 
ideologists fought each other in the past two centuries. Both approaches are highly imperfect 
because they always have to deal with the uncertainty problem of future developments which 
are never under the complete control of planners or market participants. Market are therefore 
more or less second best solutions. Market failures are because of the intrinsic information 
dilemma with regard to future developments the rule and not the exception. People get it  
always wrong, they are imperfect in their abilities to process  complex information and 
especially to predict the collective behaviour of societies. Preferences and ideas about the 
future change constantly. Markets are just institutions which adjust to these constant changes 
according to the revealed information to the public and its spread to the respective decision 
makers. Financial markets are the essential lynch pin between the present and the future. 
Money as a mean to express valuations and as a universal mean to give access to all kinds of 
assets and resources becomes the focal point were all these imperfections get visible in the 
market prices. They never represent an equilibrium state to a steady state of the economy. 
Since to quote a Greek philosopher Heraklit πάντα ῥεῖ, everything is moving, the degree of 
turbulence governing the economic development causes always some degree of mismatch 
between the real economy and the monetary sphere as its virtual representation of the human 
valuation of the state of the economic system. A one to one correspondence is impossible to 
accomplish.  
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However, it is at least possible to detect exceptions developments in the financial market 
valuations of financial assets and ask for their underlying foundations with sustainable 
economic developments. If there is insufficient support to believe that this valuations make 
any sense on the long-run, if one detects all kinds of human irrational exuberance in the 
market place about the future possibilities to earn exceptionally high returns than it should be 
time to act for those responsible for monetary policy and financial market supervision to 
counterbalance these developments in a timely manner to keep things under control.  
Even if there occur some losses in the ex post evaluation of the action taken because an 
optimal timing is not feasible due to unsolved information problems this is no justification for 
inaction. If there is any lesson to be learned from the recent two bubbles at the beginning of 
this century it is that. Don’t be complacent with regard to global financial market turbulence. 
Act according the fundamental rules of sustainable economic development and give 
seemingly short-term benefits much less weight in your decision making. Robust rules for 
sustainable development in the financial sector should counter the current catastrophic trend 
of casino capitalism. (see e.g. Stange 1986). 
Do we face a super bubble? There is some evidence that the current sequence of bubbles since 
the mid-1990ies has the scary tendency that overcoming the last bubble (new economy 
bubble) has triggered an even bigger bubble (financial market bubble caused by 
securitzation). 
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